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Abstract
The Human Factors Analysis and 
Classifi cation System (HFACS) is a safety 
tool that aids in the identifi cation and analysis 
of organizational factors that contribute 
to aircraft accidents. By using the HFACS 
model, safety investigators can better 
understand the existing conditions that 
contribute to accidents, which then allows 
for the development and implementation of 
safety programs to prevent these conditions. 
In this study, the HFACS framework was 
utilized to identify the human factors that 
contributed to the Asiana Airlines fl ight 
214 accident that occurred on July 6, 2013. 
The results of this study indicate that 
inadequate pilot training, lack of upper-level 
supervision, and recurring deviation from 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) largely 
contributed to this accident. These fi ndings 
emphasize the various organizational levels 
that serve a role in aviation accidents, 
highlighting the importance of practicing a 
proactive approach to safety and mitigating 
hazards within the upper levels of an 
organization before they lead to disaster on 
the front line. 
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INTRODUCTION
The fi rst plane crash occurred on September 17, 
1908, killing its one passenger and injuring the pilot, 
Orville Wright. Following this accident, Lieutenant 
Frank Lahm conducted the fi rst airplane accident 
investigation, identifying the cause of the accident to 
be an equipment malfunction (Lerner, 2018). During 
those fi rst few decades of aviation, the majority of 
accidents were caused by technical factors, meaning 
the fault often lay within the construction of the 
aircraft (Rankin, 2008). While technical issues 
still persist today, the leading cause of accidents 
has expanded to encompass a much broader scope 
of contributing factors. Currently, many of those 
contributing factors are a result of human error 
stemming from mistakes made within the upper 
levels of an organization, the safety and fi nancial 
decisions made by the heads of the company 
(Shappell et al., 2006). This ever-increasing presence 
of human factors in aviation accidents necessitates 
the need for an in-depth and systematic approach to 
studying the human component of aviation from all 
perspectives; hence, the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classifi cation System, or HFACS, was born. 
The HFACS f ramework shown in Figure 1 highlights 
the latent conditions and active failures responsible 
for an accident by separating human error into four 
categories, each of which is then broken down into 
subcategories in an attempt to better identify all 
possible problem areas (FAA, 2006). Through the use 
of this systematic approach to accident investigation, 
the most unpredictable aspect of aviation—the human 
component—can be better isolated, analyzed, and even 
predicted. This study reinforces the benefi ts of applying 
HFACS to civil aviation by utilizing the HFACS 
framework to analyze Asiana Airlines fl ight 214.
METHODOLOGY—THE HFACS FRAMEWORK
Dr. Shappell and Dr. Wiegmann developed the 
HFACS framework in the early 1990s to assist 
the United States Navy in decreasing its number 
of aircraft accidents resulting from human error 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2009). It builds off  of the 
Swiss cheese model, also known as the Reason 
model (Figure 2), which is a visual aid that 
illustrates the multifaceted relationship between 
the events leading up to an aircraft accident (FSF, 
2016). Figure 1 shows the four main levels of 
HFACS as well as the branches within each level. 
Upon implementation in the Navy, the HFACS 
framework decreased the percentage of accidents 
related to human factors by approximately 50% 
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been used in various non-aviation industries such as 
healthcare, but it has yet to experience wide-scale 
implementation in civil aviation. 
Figure 2. The Reason model. Created by James Reason, this 
model illustrates the interdependence of latent conditions 
and active failures in accident causation. Image source: 
HFACS Inc. (2014). The HFACS Framework. (Used with 
permission.) 
The focus of this study was to emphasize the 
benefi t of applying HFACS to the civil aviation 
environment. With regard to aviation accident 
data, government archives were referenced from 
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and Department 
of Transportation (DOT). Though HFCAS is 
traditionally applied as a bottom-up approach, this 
study was conducted from the top down, starting at 
the highest organizational level as opposed to the 
front line. This top-down approach highlighted the 
impact that the upper levels had on the lower levels, 
better demonstrating the correlation between upper-
level decision-making and frontline consequences. 
The results of this study indicate the myriad of 
organizational factors that foreshadowed the Asiana 
Airlines fl ight 214 accident, further emphasizing 
the necessity of implementing safety intervention 
programs to combat hazards before the culmination 
of an accident. 
THE ACCIDENT—ASIANA AIRLINES FLIGHT 214
Asiana Airlines fl ight 214 was a transpacifi c 
passenger fl ight traveling from Seoul, South Korea, to 
San Francisco, California. The aircraft involved was 
a Boeing 777-200ER that crashed on fi nal approach, 
the phase of fl ight immediately prior to landing. The 
approach to landing was extremely unstable, resulting 
in the aircraft impacting the seawall and ripping 
apart just before the start of runway 28L (Figure 3). 
On board were 291 passengers, 3 of whom suff ered 
fatal injuries. Forty other passengers were seriously 
wounded, along with eight fl ight attendants and one 
crew member (NTSB, 2014). 
Figure 3. The crash site. Image courtesy of the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). (2013, July 7). View of 
damage to the fuselage of Asiana fl ight 214. (Used with 
permission.)
Upon investigation, the NTSB found that the 
probable causes of this accident were the fl ight crew’s 
mismanagement of altitude control, inadequate 
monitoring of fl ight instruments, and poor decision-
making (NTSB, 2014). Some other contributing 
factors were the complex but poorly documented 
autothrottle procedures, the fl ight crew’s deviance from 
standard communication protocols, inadequate pilot 
training with regard to visual approaches, inadequate 
supervision from the captain, and crew fatigue (NTSB, 
2014). The root cause behind each of these factors can 
be traced back to various levels within the organization, 
meaning that this accident was not an isolated incident 
due solely to pilot error. Instead, it was the inevitable 
result of copious unsafe practices being allowed 
throughout Asiana Airlines, stemming from problems 
within the organization’s upper-level management.
Figure 1. The HFACS framework. Adapted from the HFACS 
model developed by Wiegmann and Shappell (2009).
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Organizational Influences
Organizational influences is the highest level of 
HFACS, consisting of the following three branches: 
resource management, organizational climate, and 
organizational process. Resource management 
encompasses factors such as human resources, budget 
restrictions, and equipment issues (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2009). In regard to flight 214, the most 
applicable issues within this branch were complex 
aircraft design and inadequate pilot training. As 
depicted in Figure 4, the Boeing 777-200ER is an 
extremely complex aircraft, hosting an abundance of 
complicated technology unique to Boeing aircraft. 
Unfortunately, Asiana Airlines’ training procedures 
were inadequate, rendering its pilots unaware of 
the inner workings of the various systems. In the 
accident report, the NTSB included statements from 
777 ground school instructors explaining the training 
anomalies, confirming that the formal slideshows used 
by Asiana lacked vital information (NTSB, 2014). 
The pilot flying was insufficiently trained on the use 
of the autopilot and autothrottle systems. During the 
approach to landing, he initially misprogrammed 
the autopilot, causing the aircraft to climb instead of 
descending toward the runway. In response to this, 
he turned off the autopilot and pulled the throttle 
to idle. Since all of the systems in this aircraft are 
interconnected, when the pilot pulled the throttle to 
idle, he also unknowingly turned off the automatic 
airspeed control. For the remainder of the approach, 
the aircraft gradually decreased to dangerously low 
airspeeds, which went unnoticed and uncorrected 
up until the crash. These mistakes were a result of 
inadequate training on aircraft systems as well as 
approach procedures, emphasizing the impact that 
upper-level training decisions have in the frontline 
environment. 
The next branch is organizational climate, which 
includes areas such as structure of command, 
company policy, and company culture, specifically 
in relation to norms and attitudes toward safety 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2009). At the time, Asiana 
Airlines lacked a robust safety culture, which 
allowed for the existence of a myriad of unsafe 
policies, one of which was its automation policy. 
Asiana emphasized full use of automation, directly 
discouraging pilots from manually flying the aircraft. 
This resulted in skill deterioration throughout the 
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company, rendering pilots inexperienced in manual 
flight and over-reliant on automation. A lack of 
understanding of the pilot-automation interface 
resulted in an increase in workload and loss of 
situational awareness, accomplishing the exact 
opposite of technology’s intended purpose (FSF, 
2019). It also fostered complacency, creating an 
environment where the pilots were incapable of 
manually recovering the aircraft. This also ties 
into the third branch of organizational influences, 
organizational process.
Organizational process involves stressors such as 
deadline pressures, quotas, and standard operating 
procedures, known as SOPs (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2009). In this scenario, lack of proper oversight 
coupled with inadequate procedural documentation 
resulted in a work environment full of ambiguity. 
The pilots were unprepared to safely respond to 
this situation because of Asiana’s informal policy 
resulting from ambiguous procedure documentation. 
There were discrepancies between how the approach 
was taught during training and how the approach 
procedures were dictated in the manual. Because 
of this, pilots created their own informal practices, 
actively deviating from SOPs and eliminating the 
possibility for standardization. This contributed 
to the pilot flying’s initial misprogramming of the 
autopilot since he had no standard set of procedures 
to reference regarding how the technology should 
be programmed. This can be traced back to lack of 
oversight from Asiana Airlines. Through inadequate 
oversight and lack of enforced standardization, 
Asiana provided the foundation upon which this 
accident could unfold.
UNSAFE SUPERVISION 
The second-highest level of HFACS is unsafe 
supervision, in which there are four branches: 
inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate 
operations, failure to correct a known problem, 
and supervisory violations (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2009). Inadequate supervision refers to a lack of 
proper guidance or oversight, which was a rampant 
problem for Asiana Airlines given that the pilots 
had no authority figure to answer to. In this flight, 
the pilot flying was new to the aircraft, so his 
copilot, also known as the pilot monitoring, was 
training him. The pilot monitoring is responsible 
for overseeing the flight and providing guidance to 
the pilot flying; however, this pilot failed to do so 
because he himself had not received proper training 
on how to instruct. He was a new instructor who had 
never supervised a trainee on an actual flight, while 
also being supervised himself by someone more 
experienced. This lack of supervision from Asiana 
Airlines rendered him unprepared for the situation 
that unfolded. Just as he should have been coaching 
the pilot flying, Asiana should have supplied 
someone to coach him on how to properly monitor 
and instruct his less experienced peers. 
Inappropriate operations, the second branch, includes 
premeditated problems such as not briefing an 
approach correctly or conducting operations outside 
of regulations. Upon investigation, the NTSB 
discovered that the pilots of flight 214 had not 
conducted an adequate approach briefing (NTSB, 
2014). An approach briefing is essential for ensuring 
that both pilots verbalize their understanding of the 
sequence of events required within the approach as 
well as the corrective action to be taken if something 
were to go wrong (FSF, 2019). Confirming these 
factors prior to the approach allows for faster 
reaction time as well as better decision-making since 
everything had already been discussed during a less 
stressful phase of flight. Had the pilots briefed their 
approach correctly, they would have identified the 
possible risks and preemptively decided a point at 
which to commence the go-around. Asiana Airlines 
had SOPs in place requiring pilots to brief their 
approaches; however, since these SOPs were left 
unenforced, the company was consistently allowing 
for inappropriate operations. 
The third branch in this level is failure to correct 
a known problem. Figure 5 depicts an approach 
resulting in a go-around. During an approach, the 
flight crew is required to make a decision at 500 
feet above ground level (AGL) as to whether the 
approach is stable, meaning all factors of the descent 
are set up and maintained as mandated (DOT & 
FAA, 2017). If the approach is unstable, SOPs 
require that the pilots immediately go around by 
adding full power and discontinuing the approach. 
This is the safest means of recovering during one of 
the most critical phases of flight, as it extinguishes 
the immediate danger by leaving the situation while 
also allowing the pilots to attempt another more 
stabilized approach.
The pilots of flight 214 failed to conduct a go-around 
despite the severe instability of their approach. 
The aircraft’s airspeed was dangerously low, and 
its descent rate was inconsistent and unnecessarily 
steep. The pilots did not call for a go-around until the 
aircraft was already below 100 feet AGL, at which 
point it was no longer possible to recover. In refusing 
to conduct a go-around at the 500-feet AGL point, 
the pilots were directly deviating from Asiana’s 
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SOPs, which, upon investigation, was found to be 
a common problem within the company (NTSB, 
2014). SOP deviation is a major safety hazard, yet 
Asiana made no attempts to implement corrective 
action. This disregard for continual SOP deviation 
indirectly encouraged pilots to take unnecessary 
risks throughout the flight, meaning that the poor 
decision-making of the pilots during this flight can 
be attributed to the company’s failure to resolve 
known safety issues throughout the airline.
The last branch within unsafe supervision is 
supervisory violations, which overlaps with the 
previous branches to better isolate risks related to 
unenforced rules and regulations as well as SOP 
deviation. The pilots of this flight had not adequately 
briefed their approaches, nor had they complied 
with the mandated go-around procedures. Within 
the investigation, the NTSB confirmed that these 
were not isolated incidents (NTSB, 2014); therefore, 
although the pilots were the ones directly deviating 
from regulation, in neglecting to enforce SOPs, 
Asiana Airlines committed various supervisory 
violations.
PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS
The third level of human error analyzed by HFACS 
is preconditions for unsafe acts, which is divided into 
three categories: environmental factors, condition 
of operators, and personnel factors. Environmental 
factors encompass both the physical environment 
and the technical environment. At the time of the 
accident there were light winds, great visibility, and 
few clouds, so poor weather was not a factor in this 
accident (NTSB, 2014). The technical environment 
posed the bigger issue. As previously discussed, 
technology plays an immense role in the cockpit. 
When used properly, technology greatly decreases the 
workload for crews, allowing for a decrease in stress 
paired with superior task management (FSF, 2019); 
however, the misuse of technology will produce 
the opposite effect, increasing the stress levels of 
crew and creating more work to be done, which is 
what occurred in flight 214. Unless used correctly, 
automation can have a severe negative impact on the 
mental conditions of the operator, further increasing 
the risk for an unsafe act (FSF, 2019). 
The stressful conditions resulting from technology 
complications led to substandard conditions of 
operators, creating adverse mental and physiological 
states for the pilots. Both pilots experienced a 
complete loss of situational awareness, in addition 
to channelized attention and task saturation. These 
three conditions built up to cause significant 
mental fatigue that then brought on the adverse 
physiological state of physical fatigue and stress. 
Figure 6 demonstrates the relationship between 
performance and stress level. During this approach, 
the stress level of the pilots was far beyond the 
optimum amount. This is essentially what caused 
such poor responses to the situation—an immense 
overload of information coupled with a stress-
induced breakdown of performance capability. 
The final branch in this level is personnel factors, 
which includes crew resource management (CRM) 
as well as personal readiness. CRM involves how 
the crew work together to ensure the safety of a 
flight, including communication procedures and task 
sharing. In this accident, CRM was rendered entirely 
ineffective due to the various SOP deviations, which 
is further evidenced by the inability of these pilots 
to successfully work together. They both failed 
to adequately communicate and back each other 
up, and the pilot monitoring failed to fulfill his 
leadership responsibilities of providing guidance and 
supervision to the pilot flying. 
The pilots also struggled in terms of their personal 
readiness, which is what ensures that an individual 
Figure 5. Go-around procedure. A go-around is the recovery procedure used when a landing cannot be performed. This maneuver 
involves applying full power and configuring the aircraft to climb, essentially re-creating takeoff. Image source: “Go-Around.” (2005, 
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is personally ready for a fl ight in terms of their 
physical, mental, and emotional states. During this 
fl ight the pilots were fatigued. The pilot fl ying had 
only gotten fi ve and a half hours of sleep the night 
before, and the pilot monitoring had a poor quality of 
sleep due to nonconsolidated sleep sessions (NTSB, 
2014). Fatigue was further worsened due to circadian 
rhythm disruption, as this fl ight was conducted 
during a time period when the pilots normally would 
have been asleep. All of these factors culminated to 
greatly reduce cognitive performance, increasing the 
pilots’ likelihood of committing an unsafe act. 
UNSAFE ACTS
The lowest level of human error analyzed by HFACS 
is the unsafe acts of operators. This focuses on 
the actions and decisions made by the fl ight crew 
themselves. These unsafe acts can be divided into 
two categories: errors and violations, which can be 
distinguished based upon intent. According to the 
FAA (2006), “errors represent authorized behavior 
that fails to meet the desired outcome. . .” whereas 
“. . . violations refer to the willful disregard of the 
rules and regulations” (pp. 2–3); however, in the case 
of overlap, there is a certain degree of subjectivity 
regarding the identifi cation and classifi cation of an 
unsafe act.
After categorization, an unsafe act can be broken 
down even further into a specifi c type of error or 
violation. An error may be classifi ed into three 
possible types: decision errors, skill-based errors, 
and perceptual errors (FAA, 2006). Decision errors 
are often the result of poor judgement; the error is 
made with good intent but poor planning. In this 
accident, the decision not to go around would be 
classifi ed as a decision error. The second type of 
error, skill-based error, lies on the other end of 
the error spectrum. It involves little to no thought 
but is instead the result of a muscle memory type 
of response, similar to the human equivalent of 
autopilot. Unfortunately, these routine behaviors 
are often subject to complacency-related issues. 
An operator committing a skill-based error may do 
so unknowingly, failing to realize the mistake until 
already committing the unsafe act. In this accident, 
some skill-based errors were the overall poor control 
of the aircraft, the inappropriate visual approach 
technique, and the unintentional deactivation of the 
automatic airspeed control. 
The last type of error is perceptual errors, which 
result from a person’s decreased ability to adequately 
perceive his or her surroundings. Inaccurate sensory 
information may lead to poor judgment, causing an 
operator to make a misinformed decision resulting 
in an unsafe situation. Figure 7 shows the fl ight 
path of fl ight 214. Instead of making a consistent 
descent, these pilots descended signifi cantly lower 
than intended, emphasizing their complete loss of 
situational awareness. 
On the other end of the unsafe acts spectrum is 
violations, of which there are two types: exceptional 
and routine. Exceptional violations did not play a 
large role in this accident as they cannot be traced 
back to upper management. Routine violations, on 
the other hand, are predictable and often develop 
after a continual bending of the rules (Shappell 
et al., 2006). Complacency, invulnerability, and 
unsafe company culture commonly foreshadow 
the occurrence of routine violations. Their habitual 
nature further increases the feeling of invulnerability, 
making pilots complacent and rendering the unsafe 
act as a new norm within the company. 
In this accident, the routine pilot deviations from 
SOPs acted as the main violation. Pilots commonly 
deviated from communication SOPs put in place by 
Asiana Airlines. For example, SOPs mandated that 
pilots make a callout verbalizing any changes made 
to the technology settings. This would require proper 
communication, ensuring that both pilots maintained 
situational awareness throughout each phase of 
fl ight. The pilots of fl ight 214 failed to do this, which 
is one reason that neither pilot realized the manual 
control setting of the airspeed. Company culture 
also added to this in the form of external pressures 
Figure 6. Performance vs. stress. This graph demonstrates 
the relationship between performance and stress level. 
Image source: Ranamourtada. (2018, October 18). Allostatic 
load. (Adapted with permission.) 
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and questionable policy. Asiana Airlines contributed 
to these violations by failing to standardize its 
procedures, instead allowing for the creation and use 
of informal policies and SOP deviations. 
CONCLUSION
Asiana Airlines fl ight 214 should not have crashed. 
As evidenced by this accident analysis, there were a 
plethora of contributing organizational factors that 
could have been eliminated prior to the accident. Civil 
aviation accidents are not due to isolated incidents; 
therefore, most can be prevented using HFACS. 
Throughout history, industry-wide change has only 
been brought on after disasters or after the loss of 
lives. The HFACS model presents the opportunity 
to proactively change this mindset. By using this 
systematic approach to hazard identifi cation, safety 
risk data can be collected and studied without the need 
for an accident to occur. The fi ndings of this study 
emphasize the various organizational levels that serve 
a role in aviation accidents and especially highlight 
the role of the highest tiers of an organization in the 
safety process. By starting accident investigations 
at the top of an organization, the implementation 
of HFACS can prevent the culmination of hazards 
from trickling down to the lower levels. This study 
also highlights the necessity of practicing a proactive 
approach to safety, mitigating hazards within an 
organization before they can lead to disaster. 
When the United States Navy fi rst implemented this 
framework in the late 1990s, it found a signifi cant 
improvement in the safety of its aviation program. 
In fact, the percentage of accidents related to human 
error was essentially cut in half within a few years of 
its implementation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2009). 
These results can be achieved on a much larger scale 
by applying the HFACS framework to civil aviation. 
Doing so will lead to a substantial decrease in the 
number of aviation accidents, saving thousands of 
lives and millions of dollars in the process.
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